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6.1. Introduction 
 
 
Information-theoretic approaches [114] to formal logic analyse the "common intuitive" 
concept of prepositional implication (or argumental validity) in terms of information 
content of propositions and sets of propositions: one given proposition implies a second if 
the former contains all of the information contained by the latter; an argument is valid if the 
conclusion contains no information beyond that of the premise-set. This paper locates 
information-theoretic approaches historically, philosophically and pragmatically. 
Advantages and disadvantages are identified by examining such approaches in themselves 
and by contrasting them with standard transformation-theoretic approaches. 
Transformation-theoretic approaches analyse validity (and thus implication)  in terms of 
transformations that map one argument onto another: a given argument is valid if no 
transformation carries it onto an argument with all true premises and false conclusion. 
Model-theoretic, set-theoretic, and substitution-theoretic approaches, which dominate 
current literature, can be construed as transformation-theoretic, as can the so-called 
possible-worlds approaches. Ontic and epistemic presuppositions of both types of 
approaches are considered. Attention is given to the question of whether our historically 
cumulative experience applying logic is better explained from a purely information-
theoretic perspective or from a purely transformation-theoretic perspective or whether 
apparent conflicts between the two types of approaches need to be reconciled in order to 
forge a new type of approach that recognizes their basic complementarity. 
 
 6.2. Preliminaries 
The information-theoretic viewpoint dominated logic in the period during which the seeds 
of mathematical logic were being sown by Boole, De Morgan, Jevons, Venn and others. In 
fact, the writings of the logicians who succeeded and worked in the shadow of Boole and 
De Morgan show almost no trace of awareness of any other viewpoint. It is worthwhile to 
review some of the relevant passages in order to identify our topic and in order to confirm 
the pervasiveness of this mode of thought. 
The two ... logical inferences ... from the original [set of] propositions ... give us all the 
information which it contains respecting the class ...(George Boole, 1847, p.75). 
... it is the office of a conclusion not to present us new truth, but only to bring into explicit 
form some portion of that truth which was implicitly involved in the premises ... [some 
portion of] the particular information conveyed in the premises ... (George Boole 1856?, p. 
239). 
Every collective set of premises contains all its valid conclusions; ... speaking objectively, 
the assumption of them [the premises] is the assumption of the conclusion; though, ideally 
speaking, the presence of the premises in the mind is not necessarily the presence of the 
conclusion (Augustus De Morgan, 1847, p. 254). 
All the propositions of pure geometry, which multiply so fast that only a small ...class ... 
among mathematicians ... know all that has been done ... , are certainly contained in a very 
few notions ... .[The] consequences are virtually contained  in the premises (Augustus De 
Morgan, 1847, p. 45). 
The very purpose of syllogism is to deduce a conclusion which will be true when the 
premises are true. The syllogism enables us to restate in a new form the information  ... 
contained in the premises, just as a machine may deliver to us in a new form the material ... 
put into it (W. Stanley Jevons, 1870, p. 149). 
We extract out of the premises all the information  ... useful for the purpose in view-and this 
is the whole which reasoning accomplishes (W. Stanley Jevons 1870,p.15). 
[To deduce is] ... to draw ... propositions as will necessarily be true when the premises are 
true. By deduction we investigate and unfold the information contained in the premises ... 
(W. Stanley Jevons, 1879, p. 49). 
These ... [consequences] ... contain  every particle of information  yielded by the original 
[premise] ... , or in any way deducible from it (John Venn, 1881, p. 296). 
That is, [in making this inference] we have had to let slip a part of the information contained 
in the data (John Venn, 1881, p. 362). [115] 
... logicians in overwhelming majority maintain that every conclusion is implicitly contained 
in the premises (John Venn, 1889, p. 42). 
 
Information-theoretic approaches to logic may be characterized to some extent by 
six remarks. All information and all propositions mentioned in these remarks are assumed 
to pertain to some one, limited, and coherent "domain of investigation" established in 
advance and remaining fixed throughout (Corcoran, 1995, §4.3). The purpose of this 
assumption is to limit the scope of the inquiry in order to avoid incoherent pseudo-
questions, in order to circumvent extraneous issues, and in order to put a bound on "some" 
and "all" as applied to information and propositions. Thus, in particular, 'every proposition' 
is to be elliptical for 'every proposition pertaining to the domain of investigation' and 'all 
information' is to be elliptical for 'all pertinent information'. In view of the role of domains 
of investigation it is natural to refer to them also as "informational domains". 
First, a given proposition follows from, is a consequence of, a given postulate set if 
all of the information contained in the proposition is contained within the set. Second, a 
given proposition is independent of, not a consequence of, a given postulate set if the 
proposition contains any information outside of the information content of the set. Third, a 
proposition is tautological if it is devoid of information; accordingly a sentence that 
expresses a tautology conveys no information. A tautology is thus implied by every 
pertinent proposition, and is thus useless as a postulate, whether postulate sets are intended 
as presentations of given information or whether they are intended as characterizations of a 
given subject matter. Fourth, a proposition is contradictory if it contains all information 
(pertaining to the domain of investigation); accordingly, a sentence that expresses a 
contradiction conveys all such information. A contradiction thus implies every pertinent 
proposition and is thus useless as a postulate if postulate sets are intended as 
characterizations of a given subject matter. No subject matter is accurately described or 
characterized by a contradictory proposition. Fifth, no proposition has any information in 
common with its own negation, although a proposition and its negation need not (but may) 
divide all pertinent information between them. Sixth, the disjunction of one given 
proposition with a second contains exactly the info rmation that the first has in common 
with the second, i.e. the information that the two share. 
As usual two propositions that imply each other are said to be logically equivalent 
(to each other). "No prime number exceeding two is even" is logically equivalent to "No 
even number exceeding two is prime" and to "No number exceeding two is both even and 
prime". The first of the above remarks characteristic of information-theoretic approaches to 
logic entails [116] that two propositions are logically equivalent if and only if they contain 
exactly the same information. In particular, every two tautologies, each being devoid of 
information, are logically equivalent and every two contradictions, each containing all 
pertinent information, are logically equivalent. For example, "Zero is zero" is logically 
equivalent to "One is one" and to "Every even number is either even or prime"; similarly 
"Zero isn't zero" is logically equivalent to "One isn't one" and to "Some even number is 
neither even nor prime". Having the same (information) content neither entails nor 
precludes having the same (logical) form (Corcoran, 1989, p. 27-31 and Cohen and Nagel, 
1993, pp. XXI, XXXI-XXXVII). 
Conversely, having the same form neither entails nor precludes having the same 
content: "Zero is odd" has the same form as "Zero is even"; "Some prime number is odd" 
has the same form as "Some prime number is even". Every proposition has a unique logical 
form and a unique information content; but a logical form per se does not have content and 
an information content per se does not have form. One might say that it is the amorphous 
character, the formlessness, of information content that enables it to take on various forms 
(Cohen and Nagel, 1993, pp. XXV-XXIX). 
The amorphous character of every information content, in and of itself, neither 
entails nor precludes a kind of discreteness or atomicity. An earlier paper (Corcoran, 1995) 
pointed out the existence of informational atoms in one of the most important and best 
known informational domains, that of the 1931 Godel incompleteness paper. A proposition 
is an informational atom if it is informative (i.e. non-tautological) but it implies no weaker 
informative propositions. In other words, a proposition is an informational atom (of a given 
informational domain) if it is informative but there is no way to drop information from it 
without rendering it devoid of information. Besides tautologies, an informational atom 
implies only its own logical equivalents. The negation of the conjunction of the 1931 Godel 
axioms is informationally atomic. 
As is well known, the Godel axiom set is semantically complete or complete with 
respect to consequences in the sense of Church (1956, p. 329). This means that the 
conjunction of the axioms implies every pertinent proposition that it does not contradict. 
Thus, this conjunction is a consistent proposition to which no pertinent information can be 
consistently added. Such propositions can be called (informational) saturations. Every 
informational atom is equivalent to the negation of an informational saturation and every 
informational saturation is equivalent to the negation of an informational atom. 
The particulate, or atomic, character of the propositions noted above does not entail 
"an atomic theory of information"; even though the Godel domain [117] contains infinitely 
many informational atoms it is not the case that each of its 
propositions is logically equivalent to a set of informational atoms. In fact the Godel Axiom 
Set is not equivalent to a set of informational atoms (Corcoran, 1995, p. 75). Information 
seems to straddle "the continuous" and "the discrete", to share some aspects with 
"magnitudes" and some with "multitudes", to have some affinity with the category 
indicated by "mass nouns" and some affinity with the category indicated by "count nouns". 
It is worth making explicit the fact that information-theoretic approaches to logic 
extend to propositions as abstract individuals a kind of "hylomorphism", or matter-and-
form analysis, similar to that attributed by traditional Aristotelian ontology to concrete 
individuals. Just as an individual brass sphere involves brass as its matter and sphericity as 
its form, an individual arithmetic identity, say "One plus two is three", involves arithmetic 
information as its content and the logical form of the identity as its form. Just as the same 
brass admits of being contained in infinitely many geometrically dissimilar brass objects, as 
indicated above, the information content of the identity is contained in each of infinitely 
many formally dissimilar propositions. The hylomorphic analogy that naturally 
accompanies information-theoretic approaches helps to make logic accessible to beginning 
students, it helps to make logic more useful to those who apply it, and it helps to make 
logic more exploitable to researchers. Far from being a crude metaphor, as Morris Cohen 
once called it (Cohen 1944, p. 194) , the hylomorphic aspect of the information-theoretic 
viewpoint has pedagogical, practical, and heuristic benefits that can be enjoyed even by 
persons not ready to accept the viewpoint philosophically. 
The expressions 'information content' and 'logical form' are far from self 
explanatory. Both are composed of notoriously ambiguous words and the ranges of senses 
of these words suitable for information-theoretic logic are severely restricted. In particular, 
the range of suitable senses of 'information' is limited by the formal properties of 
information content required by the six characteristic remarks given above. For example, 
every false proposition is informative. Thus, in the senses required here, "misinformation" 
is information, not all information is accurate. Moreover, the information content of a 
proposition is not to be measured by the number of its non- logical, or content, concepts: 
fewer non- logical concepts does not necessarily correlate with less information content. 
The proposition "Every number is inductive" contains much more information than "Every 
even number is [118] inductive". Of course, having the exact same content concepts does 
not necessarily correlate with having the exact same information content: in fact, "Every 
perfect number is even" has no information in common with "Some non-even number is 
perfect". In none of the senses of the expression 'information content' suitable for use with 
information-theoretic logic can a concept be said to have information content: information 
content belongs exclusively to propositions and sets of propositions. 
As usual, (written) sentences, which are made up of conventional characters, or 
symbols, are distinguished from propositions, which are made up of concepts. One and the 
same proposition may be expressed by different sentences in different languages, or even in 
the same language. For example, "One plus two is three", the proposition that one plus two 
is three, is expressed by each of many sentences: '(1+2)=3', 'One plus two is three', 'One and 
two are three', 'Uno y dos son ires', and so on. This article follows the increasingly 
widespread convention of indicating sentences (and other expressions) by single quotes 
while indicating propositions (and other meanings) by double quotes. A sentence may be 
said to convey the information contained in a proposition that it expresses. 
Our primary purpose is to locate information-theoretic conceptions of logic 
historically, pragmatically, and philosophically. Secondary purposes are to contribute to the 
dialogue concerning the nature of our "common intuitive" notion of consequence (or 
argument validity) and to explore the ontic and epistemic basis of logical judgements both 
of consequence (or argument validity) and of independence (or argument invalidity). 
Attention is given to the question of whether our cumulative experience in applying logic is 
better explained from an information-theoretic perspective or whether this perspective must 
be augmented, or entirely supplanted, by a transformation-theoretic approach. A 
background purpose is to contribute toward delimiting the formal properties that must be 
satisfied by any "information concept" adequate to serve as a foundation for an 
information-theoretic approach to logic. 
 
6.2.1. Basic terminology 
In the course of investigation of a given subject-matter or universe of discourse, it routinely 
occurs to the investigators to wonder whether or not a certain proposition is implied by or 
contradicted by a certain set of propositions. For example, and this by no means exhausts 
the types of situations in which such questions occur, the single proposition may be a 
hypothesis under investigation and the set may be composed of propositions which have 
actually been accepted as true, as in a branch of mathematics, or it may be composed of 
propositions which have been confirmed to a high degree or which have been adopted as 
working hypotheses, so to speak, as in one of the empirical [119] sciences or in 
commercial, medical, or criminal investigations. In this situation the investigators are 
wondering whether their problem, their hypothesis, can be settled affirmatively or 
negatively on the basis of information already "obtained", or whether settling of the 
hypothesis requires them to obtain more information. In some cases they will be asking 
whether an unsettled hypothesis is reducible to hypotheses already settled or whether 
further independent access to the subject-matter is necessary. 
This type of question is typical, perhaps characteristic, of applied logic. My 
conception of logic can be seen as stemming from a focus on such practical questions. 
Accordingly, whenever propositions are compared below it is to go without saying that 
they are all pertinent to some one and the same investigation, in particular that they all 
concern a fixed universe of discourse and they involve concepts from a limited set of 
concepts fixed in advance and unchanged throughout an investigation. In the terminology 
introduced above, they are all presumed to belong to one domain of investigation or to one 
investigational domain. 
Limitation of a given logical inquiry to propositions in a fixed domain of 
investigation corresponds to limitation of a scientific inquiry to a fixed universe of 
discourse. Moreover, just as the importance of limited universes of discourse became 
increasingly clear over the first century in which logic assumed an increasingly 
mathematical character, the importance of domains of investigation has become 
increasingly clear in the last 50 or 75 years. No longer do logicians consider all 
propositions without limitation but, in more and more instances, a logician will consider 
propositions from a limited class, e.g. only propositions about the natural numbers 
expressible in a certain interpreted formal language having a limited set of primitive 
concepts. 
By an argument I mean a two-part system composed of a set of propositions, its 
premise-set, and a single proposition, its conclusion. An argument is valid if its conclusion 
is implied by (is a consequence of) its premise-set and an argument is invalid if its 
conclusion is not implied by (is independent of) its premise-set. A set of propositions 
implies a given proposition if the argument having the set as premise-set and the given 
proposition as conclusion is valid; accordingly, a set of propositions does not imply a given 
proposition if the corresponding argument is invalid. My last two sentences may well be 
reversed in order without changing the content. I do not define implication in terms of 
validity, or validity in terms of implication; I take them to be coordinate concepts. 
It is important to notice that both concepts are ontic as opposed to epistemic, they 
are objective as opposed to subjective, they are impersonal as opposed to personal, and, in 
the sense of C.W. Morris, they are not pragmatic.[120] This point may perhaps be better 
stated by saying that a given argument is valid or invalid in and of itself without regard to 
whether anyone did or will or can determine its validity. The so-called Goldbach argument 
is either valid or invalid despite the fact that no one knows which and despite the possibility 
that its validity or invalidity is unknowable (Corcoran, 1973, p. 61 or Hughes, 1993, p. 88). 
The Goldbach argument takes as its premise-set "the" basic premises of arithmetic, 
essentially "the" Peano Postulates and "the" definitions of addition, multiplication, and so 
on. Its conclusion is the so-called Goldbach Hypothesis, that every even number exceeding 
two is the sum of two primes. 
Every argument is either valid or invalid. The fact that not every argument is known 
to be valid or known to be invalid is one of the things that makes applied formal logic 
interesting. The possibility that not every argument can be known to be valid or known to 
be invalid is one of the things that makes formal epistemology interesting. But with these 
two comments we are getting ahead of ourselves. These points are treated in the appendix 
(below). 
An argument per se does not contain a sequence of propositions that may be taken 
to involve a "chain of reasoning" showing that the conclusion is an implication of the 
premise-set. A three-part system that results from adding a "chain of reasoning" to an 
argument I call an argumentation (Corcoran, 1989). An argumentation is said to be cogent 
or fallacious according as its chain of reasoning shows or does not show that its conclusion 
is implied by its premise-set. In contrast to validity and invalidity, cogency and 
fallaciousness are both epistemic and not purely ontic, they are both "subjective" in that 
both involve a cognitive "subject" in addition to their objective aspects, and they are both 
personal and pragmatic in that they involve thinkers. 
I use the concepts of implication and validity in describing various historically 
given systems of logic even if the authors of these systems did not use them. For example, 
Aristotle has no implication relation but when he says that a conclusion follows of 
necessity from given premises we will feel free to report that he says that the given 
conclusion is implied by that premise-set. This kind of reporting could be misleading 
without a disclaimer. Likewise, Tarski has no argument concept and no validity concept. Of 
course, Tarski uses the words 'argument' and 'valid'. But when Tarski uses 'argument' it is 
often in reference to something involving a chain of reasoning. As a first approximation we 
may say that by 'argument' Tarski means something closer to "argumentation" (1941, pp. 
26, 108, 126f., 158, 175 passim). Of course, Tarski also uses the word 'argument' in the 
mathematical sense to indicate "a value of an independent variable" (1941, pp. 98 ff.). 
Accordingly, Tarski never uses the word 'valid' in the above sense; he always speaks of the 
"validity" [121] of an "assumption", "statement", "theorem" or the like as opposed to the 
validity of an argument (1941, pp. 57, 118, 128, 135). Jan Tarski's new edition of his 
father's 1941 book contains a long footnote on this point (1994, p.52). Moreover, in the 
1941 book Tarski does not use the verb 'imply' in the sense used here (1941, pp. 27-29). 
Nevertheless, when Tarski has occasion to say that a certain proposition is a 
consequence of a certain set of propositions we will feel free to report him as having said 
that a certain argument is valid, and so on. Interpretation of a historically given text often 
involves a kind of "recategorization" of its subject-matter. We need to be alert to the 
dangers inherent in the interpretational enterprise. 
There are several other locutions commonly used to say that a given argument is 
valid: were the premises all true then necessarily the conclusion would also be true; were 
the conclusion false then necessarily at least one of the premises would also be false; it is 
logically impossible for the premises to all be true without the conclusion being true, it is 
logically impossible for the conclusion to be false without at least one of the premises being 
false; were the premises all true it would be impossible for the conclusion to be false; it is 
logically impossible for the premises to all be true with the conclusion false (cf. Cohen and 
Nagel 1993, p. XXI). Although the above and similar modal expressions occur freely and 
unapologetically in certain parts of the logical literature, there are authors who tend to treat 
logical necessity and logical impossibility as psychological or subjective and there are 
others who conspicuously avoid modal expressions. For example, Tarski (1941, pp. 24-25) 
explains 'follows necessarily' in terms of compulsion to assume the consequences of 
propositions already assumed, a compulsion which he refers to as a psychological factor. 
Similarly, Quine (1952, pp. XIII-XIV) only uses the expression 'necessity' between 
quotation marks thus distancing himself from any literal usage. Moreover, he refers to the 
"necessity" of logical laws as something felt by people who are fully capable of feeling 
otherwise. Church (1956) avoids use of modal expressions altogether in his treatment of 
logical consequence. 
 
 
6.3. The roles of logic in intellectual life 
In order to prove that a given proposition is true it is sufficient to show that it is implied by 
propositions known to be true. In order to prove that a given proposition is false it is 
sufficient to show that it, alone or combined with propositions known to be true, implies a 
proposition known to be false. In order to assure ourselves that a given set of beliefs is 
consistent it is sufficient [122] to show that it does not imply the negation of any one of its 
own members. More generally, our methods of rational belief formation, whether directed 
at a proposition to be believed to be true, whether directed at a proposition to be disbelieved 
(believed to be false), or at a proposition to the effect that a given set of propositions is 
consistent, all involve understanding of implication. Rational belief formation regularly 
occurs in contexts that require us to make implicational judgements, affirmative judgements 
that a given proposition is an implication of a given set of propositions as well as negative 
judgements that a given proposition is not an implication of a given set of propositions 
(Quine, 1952/59, pp. XI-XVII and Hughes, 1993, pp. 1-5). 
Implicational judgements are often required even before we are in a position to 
attempt to make a propositional judgement or even to form a prepositional belief or 
disbelief, however tentatively or however irresponsibly. The process of suspension of 
judgement, more properly suspension of prepositional belief and disbelief, is often 
predicated on not suspending, in fact on engaging in, implicational judgements. 
In one sense of the verb 'to understand', it is necessary to understand a proposition 
before implicational judgements involving it can be made. Before determining whether one 
given proposition implies a second given proposition it is necessary to understand both, to 
grasp both. 
 
6.3.1. Drawing the contained conclusions 
For many years, even before the advent of mathematical logic, logicians have thought of 
the consequences of a set of propositions as being somehow contained in the set of 
propositions. It was clear that in some cases the containment was obvious, but that in many 
cases a set of propositions had hidden consequences (Scarre, 1984, p. 20). The process of 
determining that a given conclusion was implied by a given premise-set was spoken of as a 
drawing of the conclusion from the premise-set. 
There is a parallelism between the above logical usage and the material usage 
whereby we say that a certain amount of water is contained in a certain well and that a 
certain amount of water has been drawn from the well. Treating the two usages along with 
many others that readily come to mind, we can say that a person draws an item from a 
source only if that item is contained in the source or that an item drawn from a source was 
necessarily contained in that source. 
Some dictionaries treat the logical usage as a subordinate special case of a general 
usage which also includes the material usage (Niobey, 1986, p. 706). Some dictionaries 
treat the logical and the material usages as coordinate with others, such as drawing a card 
from a deck of cards (Mish, 1988, p. 381). And [123] some dictionaries treat the logical and 
material usages as coordinate while including as coordinate other usages that could easily 
be construed as including the logical and material uses as subordinate special cases (Brown, 
1993, p. 745). 
 
 
6.3.2. Sentences convey information; propositions contain information 
An interpreted sentence is meaningful. Such a sentence may but need not convey 
information; it may or may not express a proposition. A proposition is either true or false, it 
can be entertained as a hypothesis, it can be believed, suspected, doubted or disbelieved, 
and it (in more or less rare cases) can be known to be true or known to be false. In some 
cases, two sentences expressing different propositions nevertheless convey the same 
information. The sentence 'One precedes two' and the sentence 'Two is preceded by one' 
occupy different positions in the alphabetical ordering of English sentences and the two 
propositions which they respectively express (under one obvious literal interpretation of 
their words) have different subjects and different predicates. These two propositions, the 
proposition that one precedes two and the proposition that two is preceded by one, contain 
the same information; the two have the same information content. 
 
6.4. Conceptions of validity and invalidity 
In this section I want to contrast two broad classes of approaches to logic: information-
theoretic approaches and transformation-theoretic approaches. The latter class includes all 
of the possible-worlds approaches (cf. Bradley and Swartz, 1979), the model-theoretic 
approaches (including those taken by the early postulate theorists, Scanlan, 1991), the set-
theoretic approaches perhaps epitomized in the 1987 Tarski-Givant book, the substitution-
theoretic approaches favoured e.g. by Quine (1970/1986) and Suppes (1957), and even 
speech-act approaches as represented e.g. in Kearns (1995). 
In order to avoid, on the one hand, verbal disagreements resulting from ambiguity of 
key terms and, on the other hand, begging of questions that should be regarded as issues 
rather than assumptions, I propose a perhaps unnecessarily restricted domain of 
investigation, viz. that of elementary number theory broadly conceived. In particular, our 
propositions all concern the class of natural numbers, they involve only such numerical 
concepts as occur in ordinary classical number theory, the class of their numerical (non-
logical) concepts is presumed to be closed under definability but no distinction is made 
between "primitive" and "defined" concepts, and, finally, all propositions are assumed to be 
expressible in a standard formalized first-order language with identity and the other 
standard logical concepts. [124] 
The main reasons for choosing this domain of investigation are the following. In the 
first place, it is well-known, accessible, rich, interesting and relatively uncontroversial. In 
the second place, it represents a kind of culmination or idealization of a series of 
investigations that include several high points of logic and foundations and that reach back 
to classical Greek thought, indeed to the mathematically-oriented presocratics. In the third 
place, there is a very wide agreement on which arguments in this domain are valid and 
which are invalid, i.e. on which propositions are implied by which sets of propositions and 
on which propositions are independent of which sets of propositions. This is not to say that 
each such argument is believed to be valid or believed to be invalid. On the contrary, and 
this only serves to emphasize the nature and extent of the agreement, in case after case 
there is wide agreement concerning where to withhold judgement. For example, first order 
versions of the Goldbach argument are widely regarded as open problems in formal logic. 
In the fourth place, there is wide agreement also on certain methods of validation and on 
certain methods of invalidation. In particular, without ruling out other methods, it is widely 
agreed that in this domain of investigation, a given conclusion is implied by given premises 
if and only if the conclusion is formally deducible from the premises in a standard 
deduction system. In effect, this stems from the 1929-1930 Godel completeness result 
(Godel, 1986). Moreover, again without ruling out other methods, it is widely agreed that a 
given conclusion is independent of given premises if and only if the premises can be 
transformed into truths and the conclusion into a falsehood by replacing some or all of their 
arithmetic concepts by new arithmetic concepts while perhaps also restricting the universe 
of discourse to a subset of the class of natural numbers. In effect, this stems from the 
Hilbert-Bernays strengthening of the Lowenheim-Skolem result (Quine, 1970/1986,p. 54). 
It is important to realize that logicians can and do agree that an argument in this 
domain is valid if and only if it is formally deducible ... while at the same time disagreeing 
about whether validity means deducibility. Actually, most logicians since the 1930s think 
that it is a mistake to identify validity (or consequence) with its positive criterion, 
deducibility (Corcoran and Scanlan 1982, pp. 83-86). Likewise important is the fact that 
logicians can and do agree that an argument in this domain is invalid if and only if it admits 
of a countertransformation in a subuniverse of the natural numbers ... while at the same 
time disagreeing about whether invalidity means having such a countertransformation. 
Actually, I know of no support for the hypothesis that in this domain invalidity means 
countertransformability within a numerical [125] subuniverse. Compare Quine (1970). 
Moreover, the general question of whether in arbitrary domains invalidity means 
countertransformability has been raised; in fact, it has even been questioned whether 
invalidity is coextensive with countertransformability in arbitrary domains (Corcoran, 
1972, p. 43 and Corcoran and Scanlan, 1982, pp. 83-85). 
Thus, in the present domain, although there is widespread agreement on the 
extensions of the predicates 'valid' and 'invalid', logicians disagree about their intensions 
and thus also disagree about the correct analysis of our  "common intuitive" concepts of 
validity and of invalidity. 
 
6.4.1. Information-theoretic conceptions of validity and invalidity 
As suggested in various passages above, information-theoretic approaches to logic take in a 
literal way common attributions of "information content" to propositions and sets of 
propositions. The proposition that every number precedes its own successor contains the 
information in the following: that seven precedes its own successor, that every even number 
precedes its own successor, that every non-even number precedes its own successor, that 
every number precedes a number that precedes its own successor, and so on. It is also 
obvious that "Some perfect number is not even" does not contain the information that some 
number is even, which is contained in "Some even number is not perfect". It is then clear 
that the existential negative proposition does not contain the information contained in its 
own converse, a point Aristotle made several times.  
An information-theoretic approach to logic leads to a premise-containment 
conception of validity: an argument is valid if and only if its premise-set contains all of the 
information of its conclusion. Accordingly, it leads to a conclusion-containment conception 
of invalidity: an argument is invalid if and only if its conclusion contains information 
totally outside of the information content of its premise-set. 
An information-theoretic approach to logic analyses our "common intuitive" 
conception of validity in terms of information content. It takes the validity of an argument 
to be an entirely intrinsic property of an argument; an argument is valid in virtue of an 
internal relation between the premise-set and the conclusion, a relation that makes no 
essential reference to anything outside of the argument. On an information-theoretic 
conception, being tautologous is an intrinsic property of a proposition that contrasts with 
the extrinsic property of being true. Roughly, truth is correspondence with external fact; 
tautologousness is being devoid of information. Moreover, an information-theoretic 
approach might be able to explain why it is that we are able to make affirmative and 
negative implicational judgements, judgements of validity on [126] the basis of our 
capacity to understand propositions. An information-theoretic approach suggests a way of 
answering the epistemic question of how judgements of validity and invalidity are possible. 
The above paragraph highlights three aspects of an information-theoretic approach 
to logic: an analytical aspect, an ontological aspect and an epistemological aspect. Such an 
approach suggests an analysis of our "common intuitive" concept of validity; it attributes 
the ontological status of intrinsic property to validity; and it suggests an approach to 
explaining how implicational judgements are possible. 
Once information content has been ascribed to propositions and to sets of 
propositions it is natural to define two arguments to have the same argumental content if 
their respective premise-sets have the same content and their respective conclusions have 
the same content. In other words, two arguments have the same content if and only if the 
premise-set of one is logically equivalent to the premise-set of the other and the conclusion 
of the one is logically equivalent to the conclusion of the other. Given this definition, the 
role of content in argument validity is reflected in the following Principles of Content: 
every two arguments having the same content are both valid or both invalid; every 
argument having the same content as a valid argument is valid; every argument having the 
same content as an invalid argument is invalid. From this point of view, it is a misleading 
half- truth to say that an argument is valid in virtue of its form; from this point of view, what 
"makes" an argument valid is its argumental content, specifically the relation of the premise 
set content to the conclusion content. The inadequacy of the statement that an argument is 
valid in virtue of its form was emphasized as early as 1934 by Cohen and Nagel (1993, pp. 
8-12). 
 
6.4.2. Transformation-theoretic conceptions of validity and invalidity 
A transformation-theoretic approach to logic presupposes any one of a number of ways of 
transforming one argument into another. For example, the famous 1936 Tarski article 'On 
the concept of logical consequence' may be understood as involving transformations that 
replace the nonlogical concepts in a given argument by others of the same type. For 
example to see that the successor axiom, viz. "Distinct numbers have distinct successors", 
does not imply the zero axiom, viz. "No number's successor is zero" we can replace the 
successor concept by the square concept and replace the zero concept by the unit concept. 
The above argument is then transformed into the argument whose premise is "Distinct 
numbers have distinct squares", which is true of course, and whose conclusion is the 
following falsehood: "No number's square is one". The various possible-worlds approaches 
to logic obviously [127] admit of construal as transformation-theoretic approaches (Bradley 
and Swartz, 1979). The locution that a false proposition is true in some other possible world 
can not be taken literally because the proposition in question is about this world and hence 
is distinct from any proposition about some other possible world. Be that as it may, such 
locutions can readily be understood as involving transformations that carry propositions 
about a given existent subject-matter into propositions about a given non-existent but 
possible subject-matter. 
The substitutional approaches of Quine (1970), Suppes (1957) and others can be 
construed as transformation-theoretic in nature as can the reinterpretational approaches 
represented classically in the 1932 Lewis and Langford work (1932, p. 342) and the speech-
act approaches as represented in Kearns (1995). Incidentally, the appropriateness of 
collecting transformation-theoretic approaches under one rubric should not mask vast 
differences among them. For example, some are immanent, or this-world oriented, as is 
Quine's and the early Tarski's; some are transcendent, or other-world oriented, as are the 
possible-worlds approaches; and some postulate a realm of abstract entities that are the 
referents of the transformed propositions as do the set-theoretic approaches. 
All of these approaches define an argument to be valid if and only if every 
transformation satisfying the premises satisfies the conclusion. This means of course that in 
order for a given argument to be invalid it is necessary and sufficient for there to exist a 
transformation that carries the given argument into one having all true premises and a false 
conclusion. 
Thus a transformation-theoretic approach analyses validity as an extrinsic property 
of arguments; in order for a given argument to be valid it is necessary and sufficient for it to 
be related in a certain way to the class of all transformations, something that cannot be 
construed as internal to the given argument. The transformation theoretic-approach has the 
merit of taking account of the classical method of countermodels used to establish the 
standard independence results: the independence of the parallel postulate, the independence 
of the continuum hypothesis, the independence of the Peano axioms, and so on. 
However, the transformation-theoretic approach seems to leave no room for 
judgements of invalidity not based on countertransformations. It would seem that the 
identification of invalidity with the existence of a countertransformation requires every 
judgement of invalidity to be preceded by the exhibition of a countertransformation. But, 
did we really need a countertransformation to judge that "Some perfect number is not even" 
does not entail "Some number is even"? Did we really need a countertransformation before 
[128] we could judge that "Every oblong number is even" doesn't imply "Some even 
number is not oblong"? 
Thus one glaring difficulty with transformation-theoretic approaches concerns the 
epistemics of invalidation; such approaches entail that every judgement of independence, 
no matter how simple, requires construction of a countertransformation, be it a 
countermodel, a counterinterpretation, a countersubstitution, or whatever. Judgements of 
invalidity are all reduced to judgements of truth and falsehood. On these approaches 
invalidity is no longer a purely conceptual matter. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that the transformation-theoretic approach makes 
judgements of invalidity, which had traditionally been considered a priori, into judgements 
that are necessarily a posteriori.  But this exaggeration helps to reveal the nature of the 
difficulty. 
An even more glaring difficulty comes to light when we consider the epistemics of 
validation. Traditionally validation was regarded as a priori judgement. It was deemed 
unnecessary to determine truth-values in this world or in any other in order to determine 
that a given valid argument is valid or, more particularly, to determine that a given 
tautological proposition is tautological. 
But this is no longer the case when we come to the transformation-theoretic 
approach; for a person to judge correctly that a given argument is valid this approach 
requires knowledge of all transformations, viz. that each of them is a non-
countertransformation. For example, on a possible-worlds approach knowledge that a given 
argument is valid requires not just the immanent knowledge that the argument is materially 
valid, that the conclusion is not false with the premises all being true, but it requires the 
transcendent knowledge that the same "factual" situation obtains in all possible worlds. In 
general, the transformation-theoretic approach makes knowledge of logical validity more 
onerous than knowledge of material validity, thus turning upside-down a view that has been 
almost universally accepted. 
In order to emphasize this point, notice that the transformation-theoretic approach 
makes the task of gaining knowledge that a given proposition is tautological more onerous 
than that of gaining knowledge that a given proposition is true. In order to know that 
"Every even number is even" is tautological according to this approach, it is necessary to 
know that it is true in every model, or in every possible-world, or under every substitution, 
or whatever. 
Such considerations seem to lead in the direction of rejection of transformation-
theoretic approaches, and reaffirmation of the intrinsic nature of validity and 
tautologousness. This in turn points in the direction of information-theoretic logic.[129] 
Appendix 
Formal ontics, formal epistemics, and formal praxis (or practice). It has been said that a 
discipline is not determined by its subject-matter alone, but that identification of a 
discipline also requires an articulation of its problems and goals. From this perspective 
there are at least three disciplines that can be called 'logic'. Thus, it is possible to conceive 
of logic first as an autonomous science, as what has been called formal ontics (or formal 
ontology), or second as a study of certain aspects of cognitive processes as they take place 
in the autonomous sciences, what has been called formal epistemics (or formal 
epistemology), or third as series of applications of an organon, method, or instrument in 
each and every autonomous science, be it number theory, geometry, string theory, analysis, 
physics, or whatever. It is this third discipline, formal praxis (or formal practice), 
fundamentally a series of applications, that comes most readily to mind when the 
expression formal logic is used. 
Formal praxis per se does not have a single most general problem; but for each field 
of application there is one general problem that serves to identify formal praxis as it applies 
to that field. For example, the most general logical problem in number theory can be 
considered to be the following: given an arbitrary argument whose premises and conclusion 
are exclusively number-theoretic propositions, to determine whether the argument is valid 
or invalid. In an alternative formulation the problem is the following: given an arbitrary set 
of arithmetic propositions and an arbitrary single arithmetic proposition, to determine 
whether the given proposition is a logical consequence of, or is independent of, the given 
set. (Cf. Boole, 1854, p. 140). 
Subsumed by the most general logical problem in number theory we have the 
problem of determining whether or not a given set of arithmetic "postulates" is 
independent, since a set of propositions is independent if and only if each of them is 
independent of the rest. Likewise subsumed by the most general problem is the so-called 
arithmetic consistency problem: given an arbitrary set of arithmetic propositions, to 
determine whether or not it is consistent. The reason for this subsumption is of course the 
fact that a given set of propositions is consistent if and only if that given set does not imply 
the negation of one of its own members. 
The same situation obtains in geometry, set theory, and the rest. For example, the 
most general logical problem in geometry can be taken to be the problem of determining, 
given an arbitrary set of geometrical propositions and an arbitrary geometrical proposition, 
whether the proposition is logically implied by the set of propositions. In order to restate 
this problem succinctly, let us say that an argument is geometrical if its propositions 
involve [130] non- logical concepts other than geometrical concepts such as "point", "line", 
"plane", "congruence", etc. The most general logical problem of geometry is then: to 
determine of a given geometrical argument whether it is valid or invalid. As in the 
analogous situation for number theory, this problem subsumes as special cases all of the 
geometrical independence and consistency problems, it includes for example, the ancient 
problem of whether the parallel postulate follows from the other basic premises of 
Euclidean geometry, or equivalently, the problem of whether the "corresponding non-
Euclidean geometry" is consistent. 
The overarching field, which includes ontics, epistemics and praxis, is called formal 
logic for several reasons, four of which are relevant here. In the first place formal praxis per 
se is not about the subject matter of any of its applications. The question of whether, e.g., 
the Goldbach Hypothesis implies the Fermat Hypothesis is not a question about numbers, 
the way the two hypotheses are, but it is about the propositions. This is the principle of 
subject-matter irrelevance of formal praxis. In the second place, and this might well be 
regarded as entailed by the first point, formal praxis per se is not concerned to determine 
the truth or falsity of any of the propositions in the arguments whose validity it seeks to 
determine. This is the principle of truth-value irrelevance of formal praxis, a principle very 
easy to misunderstand. In the third place, formal logic applies in exactly the same way to 
every science and indeed to every homogeneous body of scientific propositions. This is 
why persons who hone their logical skills in connection with one science can apply those 
improved and refined skills in other sciences. This is the principle of topic neutrality of 
formal praxis. In the fourth place, any result achieved in formal praxis automatically 
applies in indefinitely many other situations. Whether a given set of propositions implies or 
does not imply a given proposition, the same is true in every formally similar situation. In 
other words, every argument in the same form as a given valid argument is valid and every 
argument in the same form as a given invalid argument is invalid. More generally, every 
two arguments in the same form are both valid or both invalid. This is the principle of form 
for arguments. The principle of form is the source of the economy of thought much 
heralded by mathematicians, especially algebraists. In fact, it is probably no exaggeration to 
say the principle of form was one of the main engines in the early development of modern 
abstract algebra. (Cf. Bourbaki, 1950, pp. 223-6). 
The principle of form reinforces the principle of topic neutrality in that a particular 
result that an argument in one field is valid, say in geometry, automatically provides the 
basis for a class of results that arguments in other [131] fields are valid. Likewise, for 
invalidity results. To take an example with an algebraic flavour: the fact that the law of 
commutativity of addition in number theory neither implies nor is implied by the law of 
associativity of addition can be taken as the basis for obtaining formally similar analogous 
independence results in other fields, e.g. that the law of commutativity of union in the 
theory of classes neither implies nor is implied by the law of associativity of union. 
Even though this work focuses entirely on formal praxis and formal epistemics, it is 
still worthwhile to compare characteristic problems of these two subfields with those of 
formal ontics. The contrast with formal epistemics is clear: formal praxis studies arguments 
to determine whether they are valid or invalid; formal epistemics studies methods of 
determining validity and methods of determining invalidity. For example, where formal 
praxis looks at a given argument to determine whether it is valid or invalid, formal 
epistemics would look at an argumentation to determine whether it is cogent or fallacious. 
There is no room in formal praxis per se for a study of deductions or for a study of 
fallacies, but these two topics make up part of formal epistemics. 
In order to succinctly state characteristic problems of formal epistemics let us use 
the verb validate for an act of determining that an argument is valid and the verb invalidate 
for an act of determining that an argument is invalid. One characteristic task of formal 
epistemics is the evaluation of specific methods intended as validations or invalidations. 
Thus one characteristic problem of formal epistemics is the following: given an arbitrary 
argument together with a given method (of validation or of invalidation) applied to that 
argument, to determine whether or not the method accomplishes its task. In addition to 
evaluating specific methods applied to specific arguments, formal epistemics also evaluates 
general methods. This gives rise to the following characteristic problem: given a method (of 
validation or of invalidation) to determine whether it accomplishes its task. In this 
connection we can recall the fact that a method of validation proposed by Copi in 1956 was 
found to be fallacious by Parry and by others (Anellis, 1991 and Corcoran and Rudnicki, 
1994). Likewise a method of invalidation proposed by Hilbert in 1898-9 was alleged to be 
fallacious by Frege in 1907-9 (Kluge, 1971). 
In order to fully grasp the focus of formal epistemics it is necessary to realize that it 
is not focusing merely on the "logical adequacy" of methods but rather on their "epistemic 
adequacy". In particular, completeness and soundness per se do not belong to formal 
epistemics. For example, Frege's charge was not that Hilbert's method of invalidation 
produced false judgements of invalidity (i.e. was unsound), but that it did not produce 
knowledge of [132] invalidity. Frege charged that Hilbert's method was flawed, but Frege 
did not claim that the method would result in a valid argument being misjudged invalid. 
Flipping a coin is an epistemically inadequate method of judging prime or composite for 
numbers exceeding two, even if by some strange quirk it would produce the right result. It 
would be fair to say that formal praxis concerns what to think about questions of validity 
and invalidity, whereas formal epistemics concerns how to think about such questions. 
Where formal praxis asks whether a given argument is valid or invalid, formal 
epistemics asks how we can determine whether it is valid or invalid, what methods can be 
used to determine of a given valid argument that it is indeed valid and what methods can be 
used to determine of a given invalid argument that it is indeed invalid. The distinction 
between direct and indirect reasoning belongs to formal epistemics and it is entirely outside 
of the range of problems dealt with in formal praxis per se. There is no danger of confusing 
formal praxis with cognitive psychology, but the border between formal epistemics and 
cognitive psychology is not so easy to draw in detail and with complete accuracy. The 
question of whether indirect reasoning is genuinely cogent or whether it is merely sound 
and persuasive is a question on the border between formal epistemics and cognitive 
psychology, but one that is entirely outside of formal logic. Formal praxis per se does not 
critically investigate methods of validation and invalidation, not even those that it uses 
itself. 
Roughly speaking, formal ontics (or formal ontology) may be described as the 
attempt to determine the truth or falsity of propositions involving formal concepts of 
categories of being and totally devoid of reference to "concrete" particulars and properties. 
The simplest examples of results in formal ontology are the so-called "laws of thought": 
"Excluded Middle", "Noncontradiction" and so on. 
Excluded Middle: Given any individual and any property, either the property 
belongs to the individual or the property does not belong to the individua l. 
Noncontradiction: Given any individual and any property, it is not the case that the 
property both belongs and does not belong to the individual. 
Identity: Given any individual and any property, if the property belongs to the 
individual then the individual has the property. 
Identity of Indiscernibles: Given any two distinct individuals, there exists at least 
one property that belongs to one but not to the other. 
Complementation: The complement of the converse of a given relation is 
coextensive with the converse of the complement of that relation. 
Principia Mathematica can be regarded as an axiomatic presentation of logic as 
formal ontology. The characteristic problem of formal ontology can [133] be taken to be 
the following: given an arbitrary proposition totally devoid of non-logical concepts to 
determine whether it is true or false. Formal ontology is beyond the scope of this paper, 
which focuses on formal praxis (or applied logic) and formal epistemics (or epistemology 
of logic). 
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